The history of the museum

The Belarusian Museum in Leimen was founded in 1982 by the activist and writer Jury Popka (Juri Popko, 1912–1990). Born in a village near Pružany, Popka wrote for Belarusian-language newspapers. His family was affected by Soviet repression; several relatives were deported to Siberia. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Popka initially worked in the civil administration before being brought to Germany as part of the wartime economy, where he worked in industry under harsh conditions.

Factory labour severely damaged Popka’s health, and after the war he had to be treated in several hospitals. Returning to Belarus was not an option for him, as he feared political persecution by the Soviet authorities. He therefore spent most of his exile working in the administration of a U.S. military camp.

From 1971 onwards, Popka lived in the city of Leimen and began transforming his private apartment (Goethestraße 1) into a museum of Belarusian artefacts. He received significant support from the Belarusian rocket scientist Barys Kit (1910–2018), who was also living in exile and supplied him with Belarusian émigré literature from the United States. Kit, who enjoyed a high reputation as a professor of mathematics at the University of Maryland, also drew the attention of Leimen’s mayor to the museum. As a result, the Belarusian Museum quickly developed into an officially recognised attraction of the city.

The museum was ceremonially opened in 1982 in the presence of Mayor Herbert Ehrbar (1933–2011). A specially established working group called on Belarusians worldwide to contribute historically significant objects to the exhibition.

The collection included numerous exhibits both from the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) and from the global diaspora, including Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, the United States, Canada and Argentina. On display were books and journals, clothing, photographs, portraits, icons, tableware, as well as various everyday and commemorative objects. Particularly notable were unique manuscripts by prominent authors such as Janka Kupała, Jakub Kołas, Branisłaŭ Taraškievič, Maksim Harecki and Usievaład Ihnatoŭski, as well as numerous works of Belarusian émigré literature.

In addition, Popka founded the Institute of Belarusian Cultural Studies in Leimen, which published its own works. In 1987, on his initiative, a monument to Belarusians who had fallen in the Second World War was erected at the Waldfriedhof St. Ilgen. It is now located directly opposite Popka’s grave.

Jury Popka’s legacy

Popka did not live to see the independence of Belarus. He passed away on 29 April 1990. However, his contribution to German-Belarusian relations continued beyond his death.

Barys Kit described his friend Jury Popka as follows:

“I held this man in high regard, a man who carried his homeland in his heart while living far away, collecting and preserving everything that reminded him of it. Perhaps he himself did not expect that to Leimen, to this small Belarusian museum, first a few Belarusian émigrés, enthusiasts of the Belarusian cause and scholars would come—and later even students arriving by the busload, as happened in June 1994. Belarusian boys and girls, young and beautiful, came here to sing their songs (it was the chamber choir of the Minsk Linguistic University) to a town that had given refuge to a true Belarusian.”

Kit himself was awarded the Gold Partnership Medal by Mayor Herbert Ehrbar in 1993 in recognition of his special services to the friendship between the Republic of Belarus and the city of Leimen.

In 1995, a delegation led by Herbert Ehrbar travelled to Navahrudak in Belarus. In cooperation with him, the Leimen association “Hilfe für Weißrussland” delivered vehicles, medicines, medical equipment, hospital and care beds, school furniture, clothing, blankets, toys and baby food to the independent Republic of Belarus in eleven aid convoys between 1995 and 2006. Due to increasing bureaucratic obstacles and obstruction by the regime, these deliveries were discontinued.

The end and relocation of the museum

In 1994, the then Belarusian ambassador to Germany, Dr Piotra Sadoŭski, established a board of trustees to manage Jury Popka’s legacy. However, after his dismissal, the Belarusian embassy under the new authorities showed no interest in the museum.

The exhibition was temporarily accessible at the local museum in St. Ilgen but was closed due to a lack of visitors. The exhibits were subsequently stored for many years in several depots. During this period, unknown persons broke into one of the storage facilities and damaged part of the collection. A significant portion of the exhibits was also destroyed due to water damage.

From January 2026, the remaining items in the collection were repacked at the Leimen city archive by representatives of RAZAM e.V. and transported to the Łuckievič Museum in Vilnius in March.

The relocation of the museum was organised by Alexander Moisseenko (RAZAM e.V.) and Ludvika Kardzis (Ivan Łuckievič Museum), with support from Dmitri Moisseenko, the Krecheuski Foundation, the Koura Initiative and other volunteers who preferred to remain unnamed.

The German-Belarusian Society warmly congratulates all those involved on the successful relocation of the museum to Vilnius. We are pleased and grateful that the legacy of Jury Popka has found a new home where it can once again be made accessible to the public.

We also express our sincere gratitude to the City of Leimen, to RAZAM e.V., and in particular to Alexander Moisseenko for their dedicated commitment and for making the relocation of the museum possible. Their efforts have been instrumental in preserving and revitalising this important part of Belarusian cultural heritage.

On Sunday, 1 December, a group of Belarusian activists from different countries (Poland, Lithuania, the United Kingdom / Scotland, Czech Republic, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, Norway and Germany) met at Fanprojekt Berlin to exchange their views and concerns about Belarus.

The exchange has touched upon such topics as:

• Political Prisoners
• Upcoming “elections” in Belarus
• Independent media
• The state of Belarusian democratic forces
• Ways of harnessing the potential of diasporas  
• Challenges of the NGO sector
• Education
• Ways of keeping Belarus on international agenda
• Democratisation, inclusivity and defragmentation of democratic sector
• Unity between Belarusians inside the country, political prisoners and diasporas 

On the second day of the event, 2 December, the main conference took place at House of Democracy and Human Rights in Berlin.

During the opening remarks by representatives of the German-Belarusian Society, the consequences of long lasting authoritarian regime of A. Lukashenka (1994 to 2020 and beyond) were discussed, building the ground for the discussion panels.

• See video of the opening remarks and welcome speeches

The first panel, “Global political situation in and around Belarus – EU and Germany – which consequences (should/must) follow from the presented “long lines” of Lukashenka was moderated by Gabriele Baumann (Konrad-Adenauer Foundation), joined by Jan Kantorczyk (German MFA, Head of Division – OSCE), Victoria Leukavets (Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies) and Alena Prikhodzka (Investigative Journalist) to discuss the following questions:

• How is the dependance of Lukashenka on Russia affecting the sanctions policy? 
• Do the sanctions work and can they be more sufficient?
• What can the Council of Europe and OSCE do about Belarus?

The second panel, “Dealing with questions concerning political prisoners and upcoming Regime ”elections””, was moderated by Kryścina Šyjanok (Office of Belarus Democratic Forces in the Czech Republic).

She was joined by panelists Knut Abraham (MP CDU, “Friends of Belarus”), Irina McLean (Peoples Consulate of Belarus in Scotland), Andrej Stryzhak (BYSOL), Valery Kavaleuski (Euro-Atlantic Affairs Agency).

The main points of the discussion included:

• What the upcoming “elections” mean for Belarus and how they should be referred to by the West, Democratic Forces Exile and civic society of Belarus?  
• What the upcoming elections in Germany mean to Belarus?
• The terror that is happening in Belarus can’t be called “repressions”.
• What diplomatic stepscan/should be taken in the future?
• The role of sanctions in bargaining with the Lukashenka’s regime 

The final panel was moderated by Maryna Rakhley (GMF of US, Senior Office). The format invited the audience to take an active part and drive the discussion towards what concerns and ideas were present in the room.  

For the closing remarks the guests were joined by Michael Nowak (German MFA, Head of Division, Russia, Belarus).

See also

• Welcome speech by Fred Dorn, Board Member, German-Belarusian Society

• Photos from Minsk Forum XXII, December 2024

Persecution of the Belarusian language in the past

The history of the Belarusian language is extremely interesting. Its written form is at least 10 centuries old. As many as three orthographies have been used historically to write in Belarusian -Cyrillic, Latin, and Arabic scripts. For a long time, Belarusian was the official language of administration in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, starting from the 17th century, it began to be replaced by Polish in governmental and cultural use. At the time of the annexation of the Belarusian lands by the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th century, the Belarusian literary language declined, but this was compensated by living dialects spoken by the population. Imperial Russian authorities fought against the manifestations of the national distinctiveness of the enslaved people. The desire to get rid of imposed foreign power was reflected in the distrust of the local population towards Russian tsarism, and the population’s readiness to engage in underground activities, anti-Russian uprisings, and even murders of high-ranking imperial officials. The Russian administration’s response to the liberation aspirations of Belarusians was an attempt to deprive them of all signs of their distinctiveness. This was manifested in the ban on book printing and schooling in Belarusian and the attempt to hide the entire country under the artificial and faceless name “Northwestern Region.” An additional problem for Belarusians was that the state and ideological machine of the empire considered Belarusians not as separate people, but as part of the Russian people. Therefore, one can fully agree with those historians and publicists who believe that the modern Belarusian nation arose under Russian occupation and in defiance of it.

During the collapse of the Russian Empire, Belarus found itself in unfavorable geopolitical circumstances. The Belarusian Democratic Republic, proclaimed in 1918, did not exist on Belarusian soil for a long time, and its government was forced into exile. One of the reasons for this was that there was a front in Belarus for a long time, and a significant part of the civilian population was evacuated to Russia. In their place, many more Russian military personnel drafted from the entire empire came to Belarus. These groups of armed people with no previous connection to Belarus seized power and contributed to the creation of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic. A short period of Belarusianization in the 1920s resulted in the flourishing of Belarusian culture. At that time, the Bolsheviki decided to conduct their propaganda in the languages of the respective titular ethnic groups in the territories with a non-Russian majority to win local support and secure their power. As a result, for a short period of time, Belarusian became the dominant language in government, schooling, media, and book publishing in Belarus. This was sufficient for a large wave of Belarusian intellectuals to emerge.

However, at the end of the 1920s, Belarusianisation was curtailed and replaced by Stalin’s purges in the state apparatus and among intelligentsia. Their scale can be illustrated by the events of the night from October 29 to 30, 1937, when 132 representatives of Belarusian culture, science, art, and government were murdered in the Amerykanka prison in the center of Minsk. According to Leanid Marakou, a researcher of those events, the political repressions in the Soviet-controlled part of Belarus in 1937-38 affected about 100,000 people, and this level of repression was unprecedented even in comparison with other regions of the USSR. Another factor that had an impact on the situation was the reform of the Belarusian language introduced by the Soviet authorities in 1933. The reform artificially brought Belarusian closer to the Russian language. Being a politically motivated tool, it was approved without any public discussion.

After World War II, Belarusian schoolchildren became major targets of Soviet assimilationist policies. The systematic and violent Russification of Education intensified after 1959. Back then, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visited Minsk and pronounced that ‘the sooner we all start speaking Russian, the faster we shall build communism.’ As a result, by the end of the 1980s, almost 80% of schoolchildren in Belarus had studied in Russian. At the same time, Belarusian schooling was eliminated in all large cities, and an inferiority complex was cultivated among Belarusians regarding their native language. The national revival at the end of the 1980s and independence of Belarus from the USSR contributed to the reversal of this trend. Belarusian language started to gradually return to public life and the education system. However, this wave was also short-lived, as it was stopped by the power of Aliaksandr Lukashenka.

Lukashenka and the Belarusian language

In the Constitution of Belarus, which was adopted on March 15, 1994, the language issue was regulated as follows: Belarusian was the only state (i.e., official) language. Russian enjoyed the status of the language of interethnic communication, and the right to its free use was guaranteed. It was a compromise wording that reflected the linguistic reality of that time and supported the Belarusian language in its full return to all spheres of public life after decades of Soviet repression. The coming to power of Aliaksandr Lukashenka changed this status quo.

On May 14, 1995, Lukashenka held a referendum, which became a major successful step towards transforming Belarus into an authoritarian regime. One of the four referendum questions addressed the language question. Belarusians were asked whether they agreed to give Russian language equal status to Belarusian. The decision to hold a referendum was preceded by the incident on the night of April 11–12, 1995, when Lukashenka’s security forces in masks and camouflage beat 18 members of the Belarusian parliament, holding a hunger strike inside the parliament building as a protest against the referendum. According to Mikhail Pastukhou, a former judge of the Constitutional Court, this very fact of the beating of the MPs casts doubt on the validity of the decision that formally authorized the referendum. In other words, the pressure on parliament through physical force towards its members can be interpreted as coercion, while the beating of MPs constitutes a violent seizure of power.

Moreover, as Pastukhou argues, bringing the language issue to a referendum violated Belarusian legislation, both procedurally and in essence. The decision to conduct the referendum was made one month before the new parliamentary election, while the legislation directly prohibited any measures to change the constitution during the last six months of the parliament’s term of office. In addition, the law on national referenda stipulated that questions that, among other things, violate state guarantees of the existence of Belarusian national culture and language cannot be brought to a referendum. This was followed by the hierarchy of official languages of Belarus established by the Constitution, and the referendum threatened the status of the Belarusian language. According to Pastukhou, the wording “equal status” is also insufficient to confirm the status of Russian as the state language.

All of these facts indicate that the Belarusian referendum of 1995 was legally invalid, not only in the language issue. This means that the decisions made at it are subject to cancellation, and the relevant article of the Constitution of Belarus must be returned to its original wording, which recognizes Belarusian as the only state language, while Russian enjoys a guaranteed status as the language of interethnic relations.

However, the referendum had negative consequences. Two of these are discussed here. The first was the cessation of the reintroduction of Belarusian as the primary language of instruction in schools. In other words, a new wave of Russification of the educational process was launched. The long-term negative result of this policy can be illustrated by the data of the 2018-2019 academic year when the number of first-graders in the schools with the Belarusian language of instruction was below 10% for the first time. Moreover, rural schools substantially contributed to this figure because only approximately 1.5% of urban first graders were educated in Belarusian.

This was also linked to the second effect of the referendum. Lukashenka officials perceived the Russian language as a priori the first language. This meant that Belarusian-speaking citizens had to invest significant effort into fighting for their language rights. Instead of freely choosing the language of instruction for their children in school, parents face the need to collect additional signatures to launch classes with the Belarusian language of instruction. The same occurs with official documents, such as a driver’s licence. By default, they were issued in Russian. It is possible to get them into Belarusian, but to do so, one needs to know about this possibility and inform the relevant authority about it. Oddly enough, these bodies usually do not inform people about this possibility. In this way, the Lukashenka system tacitly relieves itself of the obligation to explain their rights to the population. The book “Language 404” by language activist Alina Nahornaja is an excellent collection of examples of discrimination faced by ordinary Belarusians in their attempts to exercise their fundamental right to use their native language in everyday life.

Thus, the practice of the Lukashenka regime regarding the use of languages is far from guaranteeing equality. This serves as evidence of the conscious abuse of the results of the legally invalid referendum and the discrimination of the Belarusian population based on language. As Nahornaja emphasizes, although the Belarusian language is one of the two state languages, the law does not work in reality because the situation around the Belarusian language resembles search error 404, known to all Internet users.

Regime’s legal manipulations in the language sphere

Article 50 of the Constitution of Belarus guarantees everyone the right to use their native language and to choose the language of communication. In addition, the state guarantees the freedom to choose the language of education and upbringing. Remarkably, these provisions remained unchanged in the current version of the Constitution, which was adopted at another legally invalid “referendum” held on February 27, 2022. Let us try to explain this with simple examples from general language-related legislation, the education sphere, and geographical and personal names.

When it comes to language choice, the corpus of Belarusian legislation usually uses logic based on the conjunction “or.” This implies a choice of one preferred language of communication, which is usually made by state officials who prefer Russian. As a result, as of 2021, only 1.4% of Belarus’ legal acts were issued in Belarusian. Many important laws do not have a Belarusian version and are only available in Russian. In this context, the following example is particularly characteristic.: The website of the National Legal Internet Portal of the Republic of Belarus contains Belarusian translations of the codes of the Republic of Belarus. These translations can be used in the practical activities of government bodies, other organizations, and citizens. However, they do not have a legal force, and only the officially published Russian-language original texts do. Although efforts to create Belarusian-language versions of the codes can be welcomed, their current legal status significantly limits their widespread use. Human rights activists have tried many times to solve this issue by replacing “or” with “and” in the relevant regulations (and thereby, for example, oblige state bodies to issue normative legal acts in two languages at the same time). They argued that the status quo meant discrimination and violation of law. However, no official body in Belarus during Lukashenka’s time sees a problem with such an obvious bias in favor of the Russian language.

As mentioned earlier, law guarantees the freedom to choose the language of education and training. The Education Code of Belarus, the core document that regulates these issues, contains a declarative provision on the equality of languages as one of the main directions for state policies in education. However, Article 82 of this Code states that the language of education and upbringing shall be determined by the founder of an educational institution. Under Belarusian conditions, this is the state. The phrase “taking into account the wishes” of the students or their legal representatives is supplemented by the phrase “when such an opportunity exists.” This creates many options for manipulation in the absence of a desire to ensure the rights of citizens enshrined in the constitution.

The third example is transliteration of geographical names. Until recent anti-scientific and completely nonsensical changes (which will be discussed later), this issue was regulated in such a way that Belarusian geographical names had to be transliterated from the Belarusian language in a uniform way based on the historical Belarusian Latin script. However, the websites of the state news agency and state bodies in their press versions ignored this requirement, as if it did not exist at all, stubbornly transliterating everything from the Russian language. This often concerns the transliteration of people’s names and surnames. The apotheosis of the morass in this matter was on Belarusian television. For example, while watching the football matches of BATE Barysaŭ, one could see that the names of the players on the shirts of the club were spelled out in Latin letters in compliance with the passport of a specific player. The default rule is that Belarusian is used for the romanization of personal names in official documents. However, TV captions provide the same surnames in their Russified forms. As a result, the viewer could get a strange impression as if it were not the same football player but two persons with different names.

Thus, the system created by the Lukashenka regime provides many grounds for manipulation in the language sphere. Some legal provisions can be selectively interpreted, whereas others can be completely ignored.

Post-2020: attack against the Belarusian language

In August 2020, Lukashenka “won” another fraudulent election claiming to receive 80.1% of the votes. Belarusian society did not wish to be deceived by the regime. This has resulted in mass and long-term protests. The regime responded with unprecedented repression, politically motivated dismissals, and a nearly complete purge of civil society. As a result, thousands of people were imprisoned, and tens of thousands were forced to leave the country. Lukashenka’s opponents expressed that they wanted to live in a democratic country where their rights were respected, including the right to fully use their native Belarusian language in all spheres of life. It is not surprising that for the absolute majority of these people, the Belarusian language forms an important part of their identity, regardless of how often they use it in their daily lives.

Numerous public initiatives to learn Belarusian appeared in the mid-2010s, attracting many participants. This demonstrated not only the Belarusian society’s demand for improving knowledge of the Belarusian language but also diagnosed the inability and unwillingness of the state to ensure language rights for the majority of the country’s population. According to censuses, the majority of the population of Belarus considers Belarusian its native language. Starting in 2009, the state interpreted the native language as the first language learned in childhood, referring, among other things, to the recommendations of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). However, this approach completely ignores various ethno-psychological factors specific to Belarus. Commonly, people in Belarus know the Russian language better because it was the main language of education and work for them throughout their lives. At the same time, they often have a greater emotional attachment to the Belarusian language. Again, this is a wide field for manipulation by the state in its attempt to cover the inconsistencies of discriminatory language policies.

Therefore, after August 2020, the Belarusian language became a target of attack by the Lukashenka regime. Several levels should be distinguished from one another. The first one is individual. In 2022, the PEN Belarus recorded 1,390 violations of cultural rights, including 113 violations related to objects of historical and cultural heritage or the Belarusian language. Numerous cases have been recorded when security forces demanded or “strongly recommended” that detainees or prisoners not use the Belarusian language in oral and written communication. Speaking Belarusian can even be a reason for detention, as in the case of Ales Tsyrkunou. Thus, active speakers of the Belarusian language cause additional enmity among representatives of the Lukashenka administration.

The second level is institutional practice, both in the center and in the regions. For example, during the so-called constitutional referendum in February 2022, state authorities did not even bother to print ballots in Belarusian. In this context, the activities of the Ministry of Culture are worth mentioning. Owing to its sectoral focus, it has long been considered the most “Belarusian” central body. However, the banners commissioned by it to designate the anniversaries of famous Belarusians were produced only in Russian. Local authorities also followed this path. For instance, the members of the Slonim district council unanimously decided not to adopt their enactments also in Belarusian because, as they say, “it is more convenient for the majority.”

The third level is the context of regulations and bylaws. First, the decision to abandon scientifically based transliteration of the geographical names of the Republic of Belarus should be mentioned. It is based on the historical Belarusian Latin script. In 2013, it was approved by the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names as the international romanization system for Belarusian geographical names. In addition to direct reference to the historical tradition of the Belarusian language, this system was reversed, that is, any Belarusian geographic name written in Cyrillic could be converted to Latin and vice versa an infinite number of times without losing the original spelling. The new format, published on April 4, 2023, lacks reversibility. Additionally, it contains several strange decisions. Specifically, the new official transliteration system completely ignores the Belarusian fricative sound H, which is a distinctive feature of the Belarusian literary language. Instead, it establishes that it should be romanized with the Latin letter G, which means plosive consonant. This is a characteristic of the Russian language, but it is quite rare in Belarusian. In addition, the regime sanctioned the possibility of transliteration from the Russian language, which cements the long-standing tradition of ignoring the Belarusian Latin script by the state news agency and various state bodies in the English versions of their websites. The lack of intellectual and historical literacy among those who introduced these changes is best reflected in the statement by Ihar Siarheienka, head of the Lukashenka administration, who claimed that the Belarusian Latin script is allegedly “based on the Polish version of Latin graphics, which since the 16th century was used to Polonize Belarusians and to convert them into Roman Catholicism.” For a person who knows Belarusian history, this statement sounds absurd and antihistorical. One should agree with Alina Koushyk, the Representative for National Revival in the United Transitional Cabinet, who in her comment on the ban of the Belarusian Latin script urged to continue actively using it where it is appropriate.

The fourth level is an attack on Belarusian literature in the context of a regime’s fight against imaginary extremism. Here, it can be exemplified by the decision of the Prosecutor’s Office of the city of Minsk to declare extremist two poems (“Płyvuć viatry” (English: Winds Run) and “Hutarka staroha dzieda” (English: Old Grandfather’s Conversation) by the classic of Belarusian literature Vincent Dunin-Marcinkievič (1808-1884). These works were written during the anti-Russian uprising of 1863 (also known as the January uprising). In the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, this uprising was led by Kastuś Kalinoŭski, commonly known as the father of Belarusian nationalism. Dunin-Marcinkievič’s works depict the struggle against foreign power. This case became a precedent for how deeply the Lukashenka regime wanted to reassess Belarusian history. It was also the first attack on the prominent personality of Belarusian culture. Interestingly, the National Bank of Belarus issued in 2016 a collector coin that depicts the sculptural composition of composer Stanisław Moniuszko and playwright Dunin-Marcinkievič, two famous residents of 19th century Minsk, and creators of the Belarusian national classical opera.

Thus, the level of repression and discrimination against the Belarusian language and its active speakers increased significantly after the 2020 “election.” It has several levels described above and is, therefore, systemic, as it affects not only contemporary Belarus but also the country’s history with its prominent personalities.

How can the crisis be overcome?

According to UNESCO criteria, the critical threshold for language self-regeneration is 30% of real speakers. In 2009, the UNESCO World Atlas of Languages classified Belarusian as vulnerable. This is the first and safest degree of language endangerment. In this situation, most children still speak the language, but this practice may be limited to several spheres (e.g., only home communication). Belarusians are the only titular nation in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the former USSR, whose national language is in danger of disappearing.

As demonstrated above, the Lukashenka regime did not contribute to the development of the Belarusian language. It also creates systemic obstacles to its full development by ignoring the Belarusian society’s public demand for its native language. As a result, further Russification of the country is taking place under the guise of official bilingualism and declarative equality of the two state languages. At the same time, the regime uses its impunity in attacks on the historical wealth of the Belarusian language, as evidenced by the absurd justification for abolishing the transliteration of geographical names based on the historical Belarusian Latin script.

An eloquent illustration of this absurdity is the draft “Concept of Development of the National Cultural Space” presented by the Ministry of Culture of Belarus in September 2023. Its content and terminology are imbued with typical narratives of Lukashenka regime propaganda, which in many ways copy Russian examples. For instance, the text contains concepts such as “cultural import substitution”, “creative patriotism, and “traditional spiritual values”. As for the language situation, the authorities recognize that the problem with the Belarusian language is the decline of its usage as a means of conversation among the population. Interestingly, the document also provides figures for books printed in Belarus in 2022. Out of 8,586 book titles, only 1,067 were in Belarusian. The total circulation of all books was 20.13 million copies, of which only 2.83 million were in the Belarusian language. In other words, these numbers only emphasize the declarative nature of “equality” of languages in contemporary Belarus. Another characteristic feature of current regime narratives is the contrast between Russian and Polish influences. The period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is interpreted as “attempts of Polish assimilation of the Belarusian people.” In turn, the results of two centuries of Russification policies are interpreted as “the traditional Belarusian-Russian bilingualism” which forms “an integral part of the historical and cultural heritage of the Belarusian people.” Thus, cultural officials are selective about the historical facts that contributed to the formation of this bilingualism. One should agree with Siarhei Budkin, the head of the Belarusian Council of Culture, that the authorities’ motivation to create this document was based on fear of an external threat.

Despite repression inside Belarus, one can observe an increase in demand for the Belarusian language in society, both within the country and among those who went into exile. Therefore, one of the key tasks of the Belarusian democratic forces is to increase the role of the Belarusian language in the society of a new Belarus. The concept of national revival envisages increasing the role of the Belarusian language in society by expanding its use in various spheres. However, this process is long-term. For instance, it is planned that document flow and communication with officials will switch to Belarusian within five years. In the case of the media and education system, this process should take more than ten years.

Alina Koushyk emphasizes that Belarusians will not be able to build a national state without strengthening the role of the Belarusian language. This assessment is correct, and Belarusian society demonstrates a demand for it. Post-Lukashenka Belarus will require systemic and comprehensive endeavors to minimize the negative consequences of the regime that has existed since 1994. The full and non-violent return of the Belarusian language to all spheres of Belarusian society should be a priority in this process.

By Dr. Kiryl Kascian

Additionally, from 2000 to 2022, 8,133 Belarusians (5,432 women and 2,701 men) acquired German citizenship. According to German legislation, individuals naturalising had to renounce their Belarusian citizenship.

To this figure, we can perhaps add another one or two thousand individuals who received German citizenship in the 1990s, along with children born to naturalised German citizens of Belarusian origin, and migrants from previous times and their descendants. Thus, the total number of people of Belarusian descent in Germany can be roughly estimated at 45,000 to 50,000.

Noteworthy Belarusians living in Germany include Nobel laureate Śviatłana Aleksijevič, writer Alhierd Bacharevič, singer Vieranika Kruhłova (“KRIWI”), director Alaksiej Pałujan, singer Śvieta Bień (“Serebryanaya svadba”), and former Lukashenka propagandist Inha Chruščova, who supported the protests in 2020. The family of the disappeared oppositionist Jury Zacharanka resides here, and so does the opposition politician and high-ranked military officer Uładzimir Baradač. The famous writer Vasil Bykaŭ spent part of his exile in the 1990s and 2000s in Germany, scientist Barys Kit spent the last years of his life here, and Aleh Ałkajeŭ, a witness to the murders of Belarusian opposition politicians in 1999 and 2000, lived and died in Germany.

Historical context: from the Saxons on the throne of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Radio Liberty in Munich

Germany has a deep historical connection with Belarus. Augustus II the Strong and Augustus III the Saxon, father and son from the Saxon royal house of Wettin, served as Grand Dukes of Lithuania and Kings of Poland (and thereby also rulers of Belarusian lands) for a large part of the 18th century. Most Belarusian Jews, whose numerous community constituted up to a million people by the early 20^th century, originated from Germany, migrating in the Middle Ages to Belarus due to persecution. Thanks to Yiddish, a language derived from medieval High German, and to Polish mediation, numerous German words are present in the Belarusian language.

Since the Middle Age, a noticeable German diaspora has existed in Belarus. Belarus briefly even shared a border with Germany, according to the formally declared borders of the Belarusian Democratic Republic of 1918 and after the annexation of West Belarus by the USSR in 1939-1941.

In the 20th century, Belarus witnessed two wars between Germany and Russia (or the USSR) and was twice under German occupation. The first, comparably mild occupation occurred during the First World War. During this occupation, Belarusian language gained an official status in Belarus for the first time since several centuries. The second, much harsher occupation of Belarus by the German Nazis, took place in 1941-1944 and was accompanied by massive Nazi terror against Belarusian civilians, including a genocide of the Belarusian Jewish population. As a result of the Second World War, post-war Soviet repressive policies and Russification, and the wave of Jewish emigration in the 1970s and 1990s, the community of Yiddish-speaking Belarusian Jews and the diaspora of Belarusian Germans virtually ceased to exist.

Belarusians in Germany in the early 20th century and after World War 2

At the beginning of the 1920s, the diplomatic mission of the newly independent Belarusian Democratic Republic and the Belarusian Press Office, affiliated with it, operated in Berlin. Weimar Germany recognised the passports of the Belarusian Democratic Republic. Later, Germany formally established diplomatic relations with the totalitarian Soviet puppet state, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic.

In any case, when independent Belarus established diplomatic relations with Germany in the early 1990s, Belarusian diplomats used the term “restoration” of diplomatic relations rather than “new establishment”.

During World War II, several Belarusian organisations and pro-German propaganda publications existed in Germany, primarily in Berlin, under the control of the Hitler regime. The Nazis sought to exploit the Belarusian pro-independence movement to strengthen their occupation power in Belarus, while certain Belarusian politicians sought to use the Nazis to gain Belarusian independence or at least to create non-Soviet Belarusian institutions and armed forces.

Simultaneously, many thousands of Belarusian Ostarbeiter forced workers were taken to Germany by the Nazis. Modern media estimate it at 380,000 people.

After the war, tens or even hundreds of thousands of Belarusians passed through West Germany and the UNRRA refugee camps located there. These were people who escaped from Belarus, where the Soviet Stalinist regime was re-established to replace the Nazi occupation, and Belarusian Ostarbeiter, of whom at least 150 thousand avoided forced return to the USSR, where many of them could face repressions from the communists. In the archive of the Francis Skaryna Library in London, there are photographs of wooden temporary Belarusian churches in Regensburg and Rosenheim, scout certificates, collections of newspapers and documents of Belarusian communities in Germany.

Photos of Belarusians in Germany in the 1940s – 1970s from the collection of the Francis Skaryna Library in London

None of this, no organisation or newspaper, has survived since then. For most Belarusian refugees after the Second World War, Germany was a transit point from where they moved on – to Britain, the USA, Canada, or Australia. In the UK and North America, the associations created by them are still active.

A peculiar Belarusian community in West Germany during the Cold War was probably the Munich-based Belarusian editorial office of Radio Liberty (today, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty). During the Cold War, it was one of the key centres of the Belarusian anti-Soviet informational resistance. In 1995, RFE/RL moved to Prague, where it is still located today, which ended the organised Belarusian presence in Germany.

There was no organic generational change of the Belarusian diaspora in Germany and no transfer of institutional heritage, as happened in Great Britain, the USA, or Canada. Neither was there much support from the diaspora for the newly established Belarusian embassy in the early 1990s – except for a brief cooperation with Radio Liberty. Unlike this, for example, in New York, local Belarusians handed over the first white-red-white flag for the representation of Belarus at the UN in 1991, and in London, they even provided the Belarusian embassy with its first premises.

Only a few monuments and artifacts remained in Germany – the famous monument to the heroes of the Sluck Uprising in Mittenwald, Bavaria, the amateur museum and archive of Jury Popka in Leimen, which he bequeathed to the independent Belarusian state. Many graves of Belarusian activists buried in Germany after the war were neglected and have already disappeared.

Post-Soviet times: a numerous but unorganised diaspora

Photos of Belarusians in Germany in the 2000s from the personal archive of Alexander Moisseenko

After Belarus regained independence, a wave of Belarusian labour migrants and political refugees came to Germany. However, economic migration was smaller than that from neighbouring post-communist countries, and political exiles mainly settled in Warsaw, Vilnius, and Prague rather than in Germany.

The post-Soviet Belarusian diaspora in Germany lacked organised structures, with separate small communities and informal gatherings in Berlin.

In 2001 and 2004 Belarusian politicians, former activists of the Belarusian People’s Front, made at least two attempts to establish organisations in Germany, but there is no available information about their current activities.

After 2020

The year 2020 marked significant changes in the Belarusian diaspora worldwide, and Germany these changes were probably stronger than elsewhere. Mass protests against the falsification of presidential elections and political repression in Belarus led to the formation of RAZAM e.V., an all-German association of Belarusians. As of the end of 2023, RAZAM had approximately 270 members across the country.

Belarusian pro-democracy protests in 2020-2021, photos are courtesy of RAZAM e.V.

Since then, RAZAM has been organising cultural events, communicating with German politicians, and participating in charitable activities. The Belarusian diaspora in Germany, unified by RAZAM, has been providing support to hundreds of Belarusian political refugees. The organisation collaborates with Mara e.V., another Belarusian-founded NGO in Germany, in assisting political refugees.

Cultural events organised by RAZAM, such as the Minsk x Minga festival in Munich, Belarusian studies courses at Ludwig and Maximilian University in Munich, or poetry readings in North Rhine-Westphalia, have become significant contributions to popularising Belarus in the German society.

Belarusian artistic and cultural events regularly take place in Berlin’s Haus der Statistik. Regular cultural and information events, days of Belarusian culture, take place in Bremen, where there is also a Solidarity Committee with the participation of local politicians, journalists, and cultural figures. In southwestern Germany, the cultural association Kulturverein Belarus, created by Belarusians.

In Bavaria, the Münchenščyna festival takes place every year with cultural workshops for the whole family. There are Belarusian language courses for children in Munich and Berlin. Meetings of local Belarusians take place in Bremen and other cities. On important dates, Belarusians visit the monument to the heroes of the Słuck Uprising in Mittenwald.

In March 2023, RAZAM received the Gustav Heinemann Civil Award for its human rights and civic activism. It has become the first Belarusian diaspora organisation mentioned in a Bundestag resolution.

Another important organisation is the German-Belarusian Society (deutsch-belarussische gesellschaft, dbg), which for a long time was mostly an association of Germans interested in Belarus but recently became more open to participants from the Belarusian diaspora in Germany. The annual Minsk Forum held by the dbg – now temporarily held outside of Minsk – became a platform for the meeting of members of the Belarusian civil society and Belarusian democratic politicians from different political parties.

Germany will always be a place where many Belarusians live. There are many objects of Belarusian cultural heritage and works of art created by Belarusians in German museums. In different parts of the country, you can find many architectural monuments related to Belarus and Belarusians, and even Belarus-related cultural festivals, such as the Landshut Wedding, one of the largest festivals of medieval culture in Germany, dedicated to the memory of the wedding of the Bavarian prince George and the Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian princess Hedwig Jagiellonica.

Germany, as the largest country in the European Union, plays a crucial role for Belarus. The Belarusian diaspora can significantly contribute to Belarusian-German contacts.

By Aleś Čajčyc
Member of the Board at the German-Belarusian Society

The original Belarusian version of the article was prepared for Zapisy BINiM, a Belarusian-American academic publication

Useful links:

https://razam.de/ – RAZAM e.V.

https://www.facebook.com/minskminga – Minsk x Minga, the annual festival of Belarusian culture in Munich

https://www.dbg-online.org/ – German-Belarusian Society (dbg e.V.)

https://t.me/+7e1qhdQqQxphYTE6 – Belarusian Heritage in Germany, community in Telegram

https://www.kub-verein.de/ – Kulturverein Belarus

https://maraverein.de/ – Mara e.V.

* Data source: destatis.de

Due to the ongoing repressions in Belarus, this year it was decided to focus on the practical potential of the Forum. Thus, the new format included four working sessions / workshops, with the possibility of having Belarusian, Russian, and English as working languages. During the workshops, the participants were invited into think tank settings to work out suggestions on vibrant issues in their area of expertise.

New format of workshop

was introduced in Vilnius and Warsaw. In September and October accordingly the representatives of the civil society met to discuss such topics as

• “Belarusian identity in the 21st century”
• “Keeping Belarus on the agenda”
• “Belarus and Russia’s war against Ukraine”
• “Gender and queer rights aspects in the Belarusian context”.

Anastasiya Khamiankova (Imaguru Startup HUB) and Jakob Wöllenstein (KAS Belarus) facilitated the working process in Vilnius, Kamil Kłysiński (Centre for Eastern Studies) and Julia Mickiewicz (Fem Group of the Coordination Council) joined as facilitators in Warsaw. Reports on the workshops’ outcomes are available on our website, both in English and German. 

Minsk Forum XXI in Brussels

took place in November, in the premises of the Mission of Democratic Belarus. During the first part of the day collective work was facilitated by Palina Brodik (Free Belarus Center), and the final meeting with Parliamentarians was moderated by Alena Aharelysheva (Fem Group of the Coordination Council).

Participants focused on civil society, media, gender, politics, and culture. They emphasized the need to overcome the split between Belarusians inside and outside the country and highlighted the cultural component of civil society as essential for its implementation within Belarus. The media group discussed strategies to overcome competition, address funding issues, and engage with Big Tech. The meeting with European parliamentarians emphasized the need to position Belarus as an independent country, not a vestige of the Soviet Union, urging the EU to recognize Belarus’s potential for democratic transformation.

During the Klausur in Berlin

Belarusians living across the globe gathered to discuss pressing challenges which Belarusian civil society is facing under the dictatorship of Lukashenka and the hybrid occupation of the country. The meeting, held at Europäische Akademie Berlin, adopted a format inspired by the history of the Catholic church’s conclave. Aleś Čajčyc (German-Belarusian Society) and Ina Valitskaya (RAZAM e.V.) facilitated the work during these three days in December. 

The exchanges among participants, drawn from a variety of backgrounds and professional domains, presented both challenges and fruitful outcomes. Numerous individuals shared their personal experiences and opinions, underscoring the imperative for open and honest dialogue concerning these crucial issues. Regarding the facilitation methods different techniques were employed, for example: 

• design-thinking, encouraging participants to step into the shoes of their target audience or beneficiaries;
• breaking down the question in the group; 
• breaking down the topic in different working groups;
• brainstorming sessions, silent debates; 
• world cafe. 

When speaking about Belarus in 2023, one must acknowledge today’s representations of the county, which include two types of dividing lines separating them: 

• Geographical: inside the country vs. in exile and in diaspora; 
• Political: the regime vs. “the new Belarus”. 

Though it makes concrete planning of actions more complicated, understanding this fragmentation of society is necessary for detailed analysis of the current socio-economic and political situation. And on the question which with every year after 2020 becomes more obvious, – Is there one Belarus or two Belaruses? – there was no consensus.

The Minsk Forum Conference held in Berlin

under the theme “Raising the Belarusian Voice in Europe”, marked the culmination of a series of events following working sessions in Vilnius and Warsaw and meetings with European parliamentarians in Brussels. Despite the challenges posed by the Lukashenko regime, the Forum emphasized the commitment to maintaining the Minsk Forum’s identity and returning to Belarus in the future.

Various panels addressed critical issues, including political developments, economic conditions, and the role of civil society. Discussions highlighted the need for international collaboration to support political prisoners, counteract information warfare, and preserve Belarusian culture. The conference underscored Germany’s ongoing support for Belarusians striving for a free and independent Belarus integrated into Europe. The detailed report can be found on < our website >, and the video streams are available on our youtube-channel. 

The most relevant parts of the democratic Belarusian context today: 

• Though according to Chatham House research most Belarusians do not support Russian military aggression or Lukashenka’s regime, Belarusians abroad might be struggling to convince foreign authorities in their protest against either the regime or the war in Ukraine; 
• Post-2020 Belarusian democratic forces gained their legitimacy, and now it might be the time for structural development and European integration efforts;
• There is a need of step-by-step strategy for resolution “In support of a democratic Belarus in the European family” implementation;

Political prisoners in Belarus

During the meetings in Berlin the problem of political prisoners was considered one of the most urgent ones. Their number is only growing, and currently at least 1,484 political prisoners are being held in Belarusian prisons in appalling conditions. It should be considered a humanitarian catastrophe in the center of Europe. 

1) Problem of the release of political prisoners

One of the significant problems in the release of political prisoners is that there is still no special group in the EU working on this issue. Political prisoners in the context of Belarus should be considered as hostages of the regime. Among the propositions of participants were:

• divide of political prisoners according to different lists (humanitarian, etc.) for step-by-step release (a certain European country can undertake moderation);
• “shuttle diplomacy” with personal guarantees (Merkel – Khodorkovsky example); 
• introduction and removal of sanctions, the “carrot and sticks” system;
• involvement of diaspora, NGO, media company;
• exchange of hostages / prisoners between Belarus and other countries;
• a call to action for civil society, democratic structures, and EU countries to initiate the development and adoption of a resolution in the European Parliament focusing on the support of political prisoners. This resolution would include key demands:

a) Demands for release: Immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners who have been unjustly detained for their activism and dissent.

b) Improving detention conditions: Advocating for improved conditions of detention, addressing issues related to human rights violations, and ensuring prisoners’ access to fair legal proceedings.

c) Future and release conversations: Initiate dialogues about the future of political prisoners and the potential for their release, ensuring that their rights are respected and upheld.

2) Support and rehabilitation of political prisoners at large

It is necessary to problematize the rehabilitation of former political prisoners, since the release of them doesn’t only mean a victory, but also certain challenges ahead. Today, according to the data of the social policy representative of the United Transitional Cabinet, we already have about 1,400 “former” political prisoners. The number of existing rehabilitation and resocialization programs will soon be insufficient. 

An important matter in this regard is the expansion of guidelines on how to support political prisoners from abroad. The necessary information should be adapted for different European countries, e.g. Solidarity without borders: a guide on supporting political prisoners from abroad.

Though the situation of former political prisoners who remain in Belarus and who have gone abroad should be considered separately, as their needs are different, for both former political prisoners in Belarus and outside the country medical, psychological and financial help is an absolute necessity. Also, after release, people need legal advice, employment or study, which can be a problem in Belarus. The situation with mentoring for political prisoners, which is difficult to implement domestically, is very difficult. It is necessary to systematize support for political prisoners who have been released (with or without serving their sentence).

Belarus and Russian war of aggression in Ukraine 

The topic was mainly discussed during the workshop session in Warsaw, though it was impossible to avoid the topic during other Minsk Forum events. The main ideas proposed by the participants are: 

• There is a need for a Belarus-centric agenda in public discourse, highlighting the hybrid occupation of Belarus by Russia and advocating for a nuanced differentiation of responsibility. 
• The key message should be that Belarus is not an aggressor state; Belarusian civil society should be separated from the Lukashenka’s regime in media narratives. Public discourse should consistently use wording that distinguishes between these entities. It is essential for Belarusians, when assessing the role of Belarus in the present war, to balance self-criticism with appeals to the historical experiences of other nations facing authoritarian regimes. Belarusian mass media should also emphasise public manifestations of solidarity of the Belarusian people with Ukraine.
• Individual and targeted sanctions on regime officials should be introduced. The imposition of sanctions requires taking into account a large number of factors in order not to isolate Belarus and complicate the life of the «ordinary citizens» of the country.
• Long-term and stable financial support for Belarusian civil initiatives abroad, recognizing the challenges faced by Belarusians who have left the country, should be implemented. 

Civil society 

The key take-aways on the topic of civil society during the events of Minsk Forum XXI: 

• There is a need to acknowledge the political agency of civil society and different contexts from which it comes.
• The split between people inside and outside the country should be overcome, as they are parts of the same chain and shouldn’t be separated. Democratic Belarusians inside and outside the country share the same aim and goal.
• The cultural component of civil society is essential, with cultural projects becoming more tangible for implementing civil society inside the country.
• The problem of mobility became even more obvious with the restriction of travel and humanitarian visas in Poland and Lithuania for Belarusians. The promotion of the New Belarus passport is crucial for the community.
• Politicians should make a clear distinction between Belarusian civil society and Russian opposition; otherwise, attempts to unite them only reinforce the Russian imperialistic narrative.
• One of the fundamental ideas, brought up during Minsk Forum XXI is that the change in Belarus will most likely commence from within the country itself. Despite the challenges and oppression, thousands of activists continue their struggle against the authoritarian regime within Belarus.
• There is a need for systematic and flexible support to be provided to unregistered NGOs and democratic activist groups within Belarus.
• There is a need to establish an institution to aggregate the needs of socially vulnerable groups in Belarus.

Gender equality and LGBTQI+ rights

should be non-negotiable components of Belarus’s path toward democracy and human rights. Concerted effort should be directed by Belarusian society, democratic forces, and independent media to elevate these issues to their rightful place on the agenda. Recommendations regarding potential methods and tools for reshaping the prevailing status quo:

• In conferences such as the Minsk Forum that pertain to the themes of the future of Belarus and transformative democratic changes within it, it is deemed imperative to incorporate gender as an imminent value and a feminist perspective as a common framework across various domains, including politics, social issues, national revival, culture, ecology, economics, and others. There also should be a gender balance in the composition of the participants. 
• More extensive discussion on the broader human rights agenda, encompassing the rights of gender and other minority groups, is advocated for among political figures, representatives of civil society, and within the media.
• In the media, it is recommended to present more positive instances that counter arguments such as “now is not the time.” Moreover, media personalities and opinion leaders who are willing to challenge gender and sexist stereotypes should be invited.
• It is of paramount importance to adopt an inclusive, compassionate, and unified approach among democratic Belarusian politicians. 

Belarusian culture and identity

The question of Belarusian identity in the 21st century, in times of discrimination and criminalisation of the Belarusian language in the country, and the spread of Russian colonial power is of crucial importance. Currently, over 140 cultural figures are imprisoned, with sentences of up to 9 years each. The realm of culture is distinctly targeted in Belarus’s internal policy, marked by severe repression. Therefore, the reduction of budgets from donors, caused by the remark about the lack of visibility of how cultural activities affect life in the country, is especially felt in this sphere.

Two main areas of thought, participants paid their attention to: 

• Discrimination of the Belarusian language and culture within Belarus, and the ways to preserve it; 
• Belarusian nation-building and identity: how culture and mindset can be revitalized in Belarus, and preserved abroad. 

Two key messages for Belarusian culture media-representation formulated during Minsk Forum XXI are: 

• “Protect Belarusian – protect European”: by helping Belarus European countries are preventing the spread of “Russian world”; 
• Belarus is not “entering” Europe but “returning” to Europe: Belarusians should formulate positive messages. 

Results of the work include following ideas / propositions:

• the emphasis on solving the problems of Belarusians as a whole, rather than focusing solely on individual activist agendas;
• innovative ideas, including content formats both for Belarusians inside the country and living abroad; they should promote Belarusian culture, history, and achievements while avoiding political topics;
• the diversification of financial and decision-making, there is a huge demand inside and outside the country, as well as online;
• reappropriating the traditional festivals for wider distribution (e.g. Dažynki);  
• creating Belarusian-language educational content for children;
• leveraging media space to promote the Belarusian narrative;
• preserving Belarusian identity among those abroad;
• supporting cultural experts and creators;
• working on diversified and stable funding, as well as the institutionalization of Belarusian culture.  

Belarusian and international media agenda

During the meetings in four European cities the representatives of civil society actively discussed how Belarus should be seen and be presented through Belarusian and international media-channels. Keeping Belarus on the international agenda is even harder during the Russian-Ukrainian war, Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other catastrophes of today. Nevertheless, among the possible solutions are exploring target groups, their interests, and strategies for international attention, emphasizing tailored storytelling and brand management. Recommendations to the media outlets include creative engagement formats, networking, and building alliances.

Emphasizing the importance of combating propaganda and promoting Belarusians’ own agenda, participants of Minsk Forum XXI suggested the following as important steps towards media stability: 

• creating and maintaining Belarusian-centric discourse; 
• creating and supporting initiatives to inform Belarus in different countries (on site);
• supporting grassroots media-initiatives, both inside and outside the country;
• creating entertaining and / or non-politisiced content;
• studying Belarusian media consumption;
• launching a Board of Trustees in media;
• supporting Belarusian Center for Strategic Communications, which is being under development by the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, namely the Representation on National Revival;
• supporting educational programs for journalists and other media-workers; 
• working on stable funding for media;
• formulating positive messages: Belarus is not “entering” but “returning” to Europe; national identity, connected to choice not to (want to) live in a dictatorship: democracy, freedom, peaceful protests; strong engagement from civil society; successes despite dire circumstances;
• lobbying for the interests of Belarusian independent media in BigTech. 

During Minsk Forum XXI some Belarusians came to the consensus that Belarus needs something similar to an enhanced “brand management strategy”, though the term “brand management”, as coming from marketing language, can be highly disputed. Storytelling about Belarus should also be tailored to specific audiences.

On the website you may also find the working papers of Dr. Hanna Vasilevich (“Belarus in the context of the war in Ukraine – discussion paper”), and Anatol Fedarau (“On the problem of political prisoners and the ways of its solution”). 

After two working sessions in Vilnius and Warsaw, as well as meeting with European parliamentarians in Brussels, representatives of the Belarusian civil society gathered in Berlin for the final event of this year’s cycle. The main conference of the Minsk Forum was named “Raising the Belarusian Voice in Europe”.

Streams of the conference in Belarusian, German, as well as in the original are available on the YouTube channel of dbg e.V.

Welcoming Words

The Berlin conference began with welcoming words by Lars Hänsel (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Head of Department Europe / North America) and Rainer Lindner (German-Belarusian Society, member of the Advisory Board, founder of the Minsk Forum).

Despite the forced “emigration” of the Minsk Forum due to the policies of A. Lukashenka’s regime, Dr. Lars Hänsel noted: “We are not going to rename the Forum to Vilnius-Warsaw-Brussels Forum, or something like that. We strive for this format to return to Belarus.” He expressed hope that the Minsk Forum will be able to be a place for free exchange of ideas and planning of prospects for Minsk and Belarus, including within the country. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation has been a partner of the Minsk Forum since 2007 – it can be named as the first German political foundation to actively cooperate with Belarus. “Sovereign, free Belarus, living in prosperity, is a valuable partner for the European Union and an important fragment of the future order of peace in Europe.”

Professor Dr. Rainer Lindner began his opening speech with the greeting “Long live Belarus”. In his speech, he also recalled the history of the Minsk Forum: how in 1997, on the basis of IBB in Minsk, a platform was established, which provided an opportunity for the expert community, political opposition and representatives of the authorities to regularly exchange ideas with colleagues from Berlin, Brussels, and other EU countries.

“My thoughts today are with the hundreds and thousands of political prisoners whom the regime keeps in its prisons and whose release we are trying and will try to facilitate. <…> The dark era for Belarus must end: this country deserves a future in Europe just like Ukraine, Moldova and all other post-Soviet states that want to finally leave the imperial heritage behind.” Despite the possible discussions and disagreements within the democratic forces, the main thing is that they should be in solidarity with each other so that they can influence the future of the country. “Approaching those people who yet need to be convinced is a very important task.”

The opportunity for Belarus to join the EU will open immediately after the regime of A. Lukashenka changes. The requirements for the regime are currently as follows:

1. release of all political prisoners;
2. refusal of all provocations on the border with the EU: with the Baltic countries and Poland.

According to R. Lindner, Belarus will be able to confirm its commitment to democracy in the best way possible in cooperation with EU countries.

Robin Wagner

During the next part of the conference, Robin Wagener (MFA of Germany, Coordinator for Intersocietal Cooperation with the Southern Caucasus, the Republic of Moldova and Central Asia) made a brief overview of the last three years from the point of view of the Belarusian context and emphasized that while V. Putin and A. Lukashenko are in power in their countries, there will be no peace in Europe. He also mentioned certain European initiatives that are currently working with Belarus:

• International Accountability Platform registers and documents human rights violations in Belarus so that criminals do not go unpunished in the future;
• Hannah Arendt Initiative supports journalists in exile;
• The Martin Roth Initiative helps artists who are subject to political persecution in their country;
• Science At Risk aimed at cooperation with scientists from Belarus.

It is not enough to demand that political prisoners are released. It is also necessary to ensure decent living conditions and support for prisoners after their release. For example, they must be entitled to a humanitarian residence permit according to par. 22 in Germany to be able to work outside the country, where they are not allowed to do so.

Pavel Latushka

Pavel Latushka (Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet, Head of National Anti-Crisis Management) in his speech reflected on the future of democratic Belarus and the (in)activity of its partners. In his opinion, it is necessary to create a joint working group of Belarus and Germany, which would outline specific steps for future actions. Otherwise, the resolution of November 7th will remain as good intentions only. 

Possible instruments under this strategy are:

1. International criminal responsibility: it is necessary to issue an arrest warrant for A. Lukashenka for committing a war crime, illegal movement of Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied territories – as was already done in relation to V. Putin.
2. The non-recognition of the parliamentary elections scheduled for February 2024 now. 
3. Sanctions. Despite the debate surrounding their effectiveness, there is no need to abandon this instrument. Nevertheless, it is impossible to apply certain type of sanctions to Russia and another one to Belarus, because it is the “Union State”, a common economic space and a customs union.
   • The best solution would be to completely close the possibility of moving goods across the border with the Republic of Belarus, certainly with the exception of essential goods and medicines.
   • Sanctions on the use of the dollar in settlements with the Republic of Belarus, on the import of banknotes into the country.
   • It is necessary to find and arrest the foreign assets of A. Lukashenka’s family and wallets.
   • Sanctions against the “Union State”.
4. Project of the national Belarusian university abroad.
5. It is necessary to develop and use counter-propaganda; true information must get inside Belarus.
6. Political prisoners are an absolute priority issue for democratic forces now.

Panel I Politics

Germany and Europe at the Side of Belarus: Way Forward in Support of the Democracy Movement

Toni Michel (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Desk Officer for Western and Southern Europe) moderated the panel in the absence of Jakob Wöllenstein (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Head of the International Office Belarus), who could not fly to Berlin from Vilnius due to weather conditions. 

Dr. Ryhor Astapenia (Founder and Distinguished Fellow of Center for New Ideas; Academy Associate and Belarus Initiative, Chatham House) spoke about the state of affairs in Belarus after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He also mentioned the Chatham House research, the results of which show that the majority of Belarusians do not support Russian military aggression, as well as the policies of A. Lukashenka’s regime.

Katia Glod (Policy Fellow, European Leadership Network) shared her opinion that the Belarusian opposition [after 2020] has gained legitimacy in the eyes of both the international community and society within Belarus. At the same time, it is important to understand that democratic forces are only at the beginning of building structures and institutionalization, so it is necessary to facilitate this by providing them with platforms and opportunities for interaction. According to the expert, the opposition should work more actively in the practical direction of future European integration of Belarus and reforms in various spheres (science, education, health care, economy). It is very important to win the minds of the Belarusian people – so that they continue to support the opposition.

Anatoli Liabedzka (United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Advisor for the Constitutional Reform and Interparliamentary Cooperation): Belarus should be present on the international agenda, but at the same time, “more Europe” should be in the hearts and minds of Belarusians. There is an Alliance of parliamentary groups “For a democratic Belarus”, which includes representatives of the parliaments of 23 countries, from Canada and the USA to Georgia and Moldova.

The speaker is convinced that through the parliamentary dimension Belarusians can promote their own agenda. “We adopt good documents, but there is no correlation between what is adopted and what works in practice,” says Mr. Liabedzka. It is necessary to develop a step-by-step strategy for the implementation of the resolution. In response to the previous speakers Mr. Liabedzka noted that most Belarusians do not support the regime, but they also have questions: What kind of Belarus do you propose to live in? What can you offer? It is very important to answer these questions, to show Belarusians an alternative.

Žygimantas Pavilionis (Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, Vice President, Country Manager for Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) joined the conference online. He noted that Lithuanian politicians always look to Berlin and have certain expectations from their German colleagues. In his speech, he paid attention to the historical connection between Lithuania, Germany and Belarus. In 2024, according to Mr. Pavilionis, the long-term future of Europe will be decided.

The lesson that Germany has learned over the last year is that it is necessary to listen to its eastern neighbors. This is the opinion of Robin Wagener (Federal Foreign Office, Coordinator for Intersocietal Cooperation with the Southern Caucasus, the Republic of Moldova and Central Asia). Support for Belarus is also support for the fight in Ukraine. The fight for democracy must be implemented with concrete steps. Supporting Belarus is not a sprint, but a marathon; it is also worth considering the situation in Belarus in the context of EU expansion. Supporting Belarus is a strategic interest for Europe, which is interested in having a stable democratic country next to it.

During the discussion, question and answer session, the participants of the panel talked about the role of the parliamentary elections planned in Belarus for 2024 and the participation of the civil society in them, changes in the legislation that took place in the last year. Comments were made from the audience about the disunity and opposition of the Belarusian democratic forces today, which hinders their joint work for the benefit of democratic transformations in Belarus. It was discussed how much A. Lukashenka really feels confident in his position in 2023, as well as the possibility of dialogue with the regime and options for its split from within.

Panel II – Economics

Current State of the Economy in Belarus, Impact of Sanctions and Belarusian Business Abroad. Exploring Critical Dependence from Russia: a Roadmap for Future?

Stefan Kägebein (Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Regional Director Eastern Europe) moderated the second panel of this year’s Minsk Forum in Berlin. Firstly, the panelists talked about domestic economic events in Belarus, then discussed the international context and foreign economic relations of today’s Belarus, and afterwards they answered questions from the audience.

At the beginning of the panel, Robert Kirchner (German Economic Team, Deputy Head) spoke about the current macroeconomic situation in Belarus. The main points of his speech were:

• The Belarusian authorities have limited access to certain economic data – this makes the work of economists more difficult, but at the same time more important.
• As we can see, in 2022 the Belarusian economy was under a strong negative influence of sanctions. The loss of Ukraine as one of the trading partners became a noticeable problem for Belarus – a decrease in GDP by almost 5% was observed, which indicates the worst recession since the 1990s. But in 2023, economic growth will resume. Belarus again receives cheap oil from Russia, which it then re-exports in the form of oil products through gray schemes to other countries. Salaries of the population are growing, inflation is at a low level thanks to the adopted administrative measures, and trade is recovering.
• A tendency for stagnation is predicted for next year. Old methods of production are once again the main source of economic growth – Belarus is once again ceasing to be a modern economy.

Dr. Lev Lvovsky (BEROC, Academic Director) spoke about the directions of the internal economic policy of the Belarusian state:

• Increasing state control in all possible areas of the economy; an unprecedented system of price control;
• Raising and creating new taxes;
• Control of the labor market – new laws on forced labor after university, for example.

The expert also commented on the foreign economic policy of the regime: many attempts to get more money and resources from Russia, as well as obvious attempts to find other partners.

Uladzimir Rak (The International Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS), Head of Energy SecurityDepartment) noted that the construction of the nuclear power plant is fundamentally changing the energy system of Belarus, because:

• In terms of its capacity, this is a very large station for Belarus, which leads to overproduction of energy and stopping the development of renewable energy in the country.
• Through construction quotas, there is no legal opportunity to build new sources of renewable energy, and no financing.
• The process of improving energy efficiency has stopped (almost 7 years already).
• The work of a number of NGOs that worked with energy has been suspended.

During the panel, it was emphasized that the energy sector is a key sector for economic independence.

Good news was shared by Sierz Naurodski (ABBA, Vice President, Country Manager for Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia):

• Belarusian business abroad exists in a volume and quality that can be called a separate sector or institution, it has established itself in the EU;
• Belarusian business affects the EU economy: Belarusians not only take away jobs, but also create them. Now there are 8,100 companies with Belarusian roots in the EU, which is at least 17,000 jobs.

Speaking of Germany, there are now up to 100 Belarusian companies in this country, which is less than 1% of the entire EU. Only half of these companies openly talk about their business relations with Belarus.

Sierz Naurodski also talked about the Association of Belarusian Business Abroad (ABBA): on the one hand, the Association holds networking meetings and forums, on the other hand, it helps entrepreneurs solve financial problems and find investors. One of ABBA’s successes: negotiations with the European Commission, which will open a special investment fund for Belarusian business in the EU next year, will soon be finished. In his opinion, it is necessary to increase the number of Belarusian investment events – days of investors and days of knowledge about the Belarusian sector of the economy.

During the question and answer session, the participants of the conference discussed the economic integration of Belarus and Russia and how Belarus helps the Russian war machine, how the structure of trade between Belarus and Germany changed during the war.

Russian support smooths the negative impact of sanctions on the financial situation of A. Lukashenka’s regime; it is necessary to look for methods in order to increase the effectiveness of already introduced sanctions, and not only to introduce new ones. As noted by experts, the circumvention of sanctions is rather specific cases of dishonest behavior, and not a centralized strategy. Sanctions circumvention is difficult to detect, and proving it is a separate long, slow, but necessary process.

Today it is difficult to talk about the future collapse of the economy of Belarus; rather, the country is destined for stagnation.

Panel III – Society 

Belarusian Civil Society: Key Activities, Challenges & Perspectives for the Future Work

Presentation of the results of the discussions during the Minsk Forum Klausur by representatives of Belarusian Civil Society in Berlin, December 1—3.

Aleś Čajčyc (German-Belarusian Society, Board Member) made the opening speech at this panel. He also moderated the discussion.

In his introductory speech Mr. Čajčyc talked about how the Klausur went:

• About 30 people participated in the meeting, all of whom currently live abroad. But this was not a meeting of the “diaspora” in the usual sense of the word: it was about the Belarusian civil society, which at the moment is forced to act in exile;
• Different profiles of participants: human rights organizations, mass media, political organizations, NGOs, academic community were represented;
• People with different political views and affiliations were present – both supporters of S. Tsikhanouskaya and her opponents, both conservatives and liberals, – it ensured a diversity of opinions and a meaningful and interesting discussion.

Discussion during these three days focused on two main areas:

• political prisoners, their release, support and rehabilitation;
• confrontation with the regime in the information space and in the ideological sphere.

Dr. Iryna Sidorskaya (independent researcher) presented the results of work on the topic

Supporting information stability and national security of democratic Belarus

After the rigged elections of 2020, the regime of A. Lukashenka declared war on independent media:

• persecution of journalists: 31 media representatives are currently behind bars, including 8 women;
• declaring mass media “extremist” and criminalizing their consumption;
• restriction of access to mass media.

Why the work and support of independent media is important:

• at least 50% of the respondents note that they consume information from independent media;
• Belarusians in exile are avid readers of independent mass media;
• the existing pro-Russian and anti-democratic sentiments in Belarus are formed under the pressure of mass media, especially television, affiliated with the Belarusian and Russian states.

Key messages and values to convey:

Messages: 

• Belarusian society are stakeholders, not victims;
• Belarusian society identifies itself with European values;
• Belarus and Belarusians are a separate nation, not part of the “Russian world”.

Values: independence; freedom of speech, human rights; grassroots activism.

The main components of information sustainability:

• Strong and persuasive own agenda;
• Fight against propaganda.

Belarusian independent mass media and non-institutionalized media projects are highly sought after by the Belarusian audience.

Whom it’s important to support:

• Belarusian creators of mass media and content in exile;
• Grassroots media initiatives within the country;
• Professional associations (BAJ, MediaIQ);
• Initiatives to inform Belarus in different countries (on site);
• Belarusian Center for Strategic Communications (coordination of inter-sectoral interaction and development of clear and consistent narratives) – under development. This initiative was put forward by the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, namely the Representation on National Revival;
• Center for the promotion of Belarus (creating and promoting a new brand for Belarus with the messages discussed above) – to be clarified.

How to support:

• Constant monitoring of media consumption in Belarus;
• Support for new and existing media projects and institutions;
• Support for the creation and development of centers of strategic communications and promotion of Belarus;
• Support of educational programs for youth and media specialists;
• Professional exchange with mass media and NGOs.

Rethinking approaches to the release of political prisoners in Belarus

The results of the second working group were presented by Dmitry Balkunets (Belarus Democratic Forum, Co-organizer). The current situation with political prisoners in Belarus is a humanitarian disaster for Europe. According to human rights organizations, there are currently about 1,500 political prisoners in Belarus, but in reality there are up to 6,000 of them.

The main thesis of the speech: it is impossible to solve the problem at the level at which it arose – it is necessary to step up above it.

A. Lukashenka’s motivation to keep political prisoners and continue repression can be seen as follows:

• Revenge for 2020;
• Ways to stabilize the situation in Belarus;
• Creating a pool of hostages for negotiations with the EU and the USA;
• Compulsion to recognize A. Lukashenka as president.

Key actors, from different sides:

• А. Lukashenka 
• Power block (police, special services, prosecutor’s office, courts)
• The Kremlin
• Relatives of political prisoners
• Part of officials
• Civil society 
• the EU / the USA
• Vatican / China / Ukraine

The motivation of Germany / the EU to facilitate or not to facilitate the release of political prisoners in Belarus:

Against the release:

• Priority of other international problems;
• Prisoners are not EU citizens;
• The presence of political prisoners does not affect the economy of the EU;
• An active position on political prisoners can create a threat to the interests of European business in Belarus and Russia;
• The presence of political prisoners does not affect the security of the EU;
• Big business, interested in doing business with Russia and Belarus, can act as a lobbyist and block activities for the release of political prisoners;
• The threat of closing the embassies of the EU countries in Belarus;
• Lack of desire.

For release:

• The presence of political prisoners is a challenge to the values of human rights, which are a priority for a free Europe;
• The release of political prisoners is a humanitarian mission of the EU;
• The release of political prisoners as a matter of EU prestige;
• Potential for business in case of resolution of the political crisis in Belarus;
• Belarus should not be a threat to the security of Germany and the EU;
• Impact on political processes in Russia.

Suggestions: The issue of the release of political prisoners should be resolved separately; as an option – the creation of an international Ad-hoc group on the release of political prisoners. There is a need for a specific person or structure from the EU or Germany responsible for this problem: the work must be systematized, the proposals must be tracked and summarized.

Step by step: an individual approach is needed to release each and every political prisoner. Solidarity between the citizens of Belarus, the EU, landmarks, and political figures is also necessary.

Methods:

• Identifying the motivation of the main actors;
• Carrot and stick policy (ultimatum, sanctions, tribunal, etc.);
• Shuttle diplomacy (mediation of very influential persons);
• The inclusion of some groups in the exchange of prisoners between Russia and Ukraine;
• Redemption;
• Letters from citizens to politicians with a request to help in the release of political prisoners.

Possibilities of solving the problem of political prisoners:

• Creation of conditions for national dialogue;
• Formation of legitimate institutions of power;
• Organization of law enforcement bodies (prosecutor’s office, court);
• Organization of an international tribunal;
• Forcing the regime to negotiate;
• Sanctions as an ultimatum for A. Lukashenka: The release of all political prisoners or the EU will block all movement of cargo trains from Belarus.

Common actions in order to support political prisoners

Alina Kharysava (Coordination Council of Belarus (Fem Fraction), Member) spoke about her working group.

Main actors and suggestions for them:

• Human rights defenders, NGOs, MFA workers, donors: suggest help, involve actors, cooperate and be flexible 
• Former political prisoners, their families and children:  ask for help and accept it 

Currently, there are about 1,500 political prisoners and about 1,400 former political prisoners in Belarus (data of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus). What we do not know is how many of them remained in Belarus, and how many went abroad. But what is clear is that repression is only growing.

Suggestions:

1. Medical support – 

• To work with relatives – to prepare them to any challenges;
• Check-lists – to make a full health check-up; 
• Health insurance – to recover from medical tortures; 
• Health resorts – to again feel like a subject. 

2. Psychological support –  

• Mentorship – to help with adaptation;
• Godparenthood – continue and involve more, keep in touch; 
• Restart of EU programs – to help former prisoners;
• Local activism – support it financially.  

3. Financial support –

• Financial support for basic needs;
• Access to the labor market with help of ABBA, ByMapka and European programs.  

A number of organizations working on this topic:

Одно Окно, Dissidentby, Legal Hub, Bysol, Viasna, Politzek.me 

Materials / Links that should be distributed:

DissidentBy, Categories for help 

Solidarity without borders: a guide on supporting political prisoners from abroad

The final speech of this panel was the speech of Ales Lapko (Belarusian Youth Hub, Executive Director) on the topic “Preserving Belarusian language, culture and national identity. Strategies for Surviving Aggressive Encroachments by “The Russian

World” and Combating Discrimination and Ideological Pressure from Russia and the Lukashenko Regime”.

According to the data of Belarusian Council for Culture, more than 140 cultural figures are behind bars today. In the conditions of repression and mass migration, the preservation of national identity, language and culture becomes even more important. Preservation of Belarusian culture is not a struggle against Russian cultural figures, but:

• The right of Belarusians to freely use their language, and not to live in fear of being arrested for it on the street;
• The right to study real history, and not the one rewritten by politicians;
• The right to be proud of the fact that you are Belarusian, a descendant of ancient European traditions, and a representative of a nation that is just reviving.

Today’s Belarus needs: decolonization, decommunization, de-Sovietization.

Another area of work is supporting those cultural figures who are in exile and cannot return to Belarus due to persecution by the authorities. They create Belarusian culture, are its ambassadors and locomotives, and fit it into the big European family.

Since 2020, more than 300,000 Belarusians have emigrated; most of all – in the EU (Poland and Lithuania). It is important to preserve Belarusianness among Belarusians abroad, who historically assimilate and integrate very quickly.

Integration of Belarusian cultural initiatives: framework of coordination and support

1. The United Transitional Cabinet Representative for National Revival
2. Council of Culture
3. Inbelkult 2.0
4. Institute of Book
5. Filmmakers Institute
6. History Institute
7. Diaspora Organizations
8. Media

“Defending Belarusian culture, we will protect European civilization” – this is how Ales Lapko concluded his speech.

The panel continued with a question and answer session; those interested talked more specifically about the creation of an Ad-hoc group and similar examples from recent European history. To the question about the cooperation of such an Ad-hoc group with Volha Harbunova  / the United Transitional Cabinet in general, Dmitry Balkunets answered that it is necessary for this group to be created not by Belarusians, but by European public and political figures, who, among other things, will be authorities for A. Lukashenko. It was discussed how to convey true information to the regions of the Republic of Belarus.

In the comments from the audience, it was noted that the political prisoners of Belarus are hostages of the opposition of democratic forces and the regime, and sanctions are only a factor in the continuation of repression.

Closing remarks

Matthias Lüttenberg (Federal Foreign Office, Director for Eastern Europe, theCaucasus and Central Asia) 

Matthias Lüttenberg listed and summarized the current challenges, which the Belarusian democratic community is facing right now, and also talked about the current state of relations between Belarus and Germany.

Despite the fact that more than three years have passed since the peaceful protests against the falsified elections, they still determine the everyday life of Belarusians.

Matthias Lüttenberg noted that in Germany they know about the number of political prisoners, which continues to increase, as well as the worsening of prison conditions. Together with his colleagues, he is trying to attract international attention to this problem.

Despite the fact that a number of large German institutions can no longer work in Belarus (for example, the Goethe Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service) – Germany manages to do certain things in cooperation with Libereco.

Unfortunately, the regime of Belarus is now a danger not only for its nation, but also for its neighbors in the region – it increases instability and danger.

The attempt to influence the regime follows the path of applying sanctions, applying different approaches to Belarus and Russia – this is how the EU tries to show that it understands the difference between the relationship of the peoples of Belarus and Russia to the war in Ukraine.

The German government and parliament constantly continue their work to support the Belarusian civil society. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany tries to offer assistance initiatives for certain groups that are under attack (people of culture, scientists, journalists).

“It is very important for us that the Minsk Forum continues. We hope that it will become a source of hope for better relations between Germany and Belarus. […] The Federal Government of Germany will support Belarusians on their way to a free and independent Belarus, which will be part of Europe”, Matthias Lüttenberg concluded his speech on such a positive note.

BE: https://youtube.com/live/Fu3o62AAsPw?feature=share

DE: https://youtube.com/live/wOs79C4MqLY?feature=share

You’ll be able to find all versions on dbg e.V.’s youtube about a week after the conference: Belarusian, English, German and the original version.